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The Use of Prior Statements
In Pennsylvania Civil Trials
by MILFORD J. MEYER*
Questions regarding the use of prior statements in trials in
Pennsylvania arise in almost every action. Yet there has been no
comprehensive study made of the multiple decisions treating the
subject. In attempting to define and correlate the many applicable
principles, two things must be kept in mind: (1) frequently the is-
sue raised is not fundamental and is decided on an ad hoc basis; (2)
the material distinctions between the use and effect of statements
of parties and witnesses are often overlooked. In order to make
these distinctions clear, this study will consider prior statements
made by parties and witnesses separately. Among the areas to be
considered will be the types of statements admissible, the eviden-
tary effect to be accorded the statement when it is admitted (when
the statement can be used as substantive evidence and when it can
come in only for purposes of confirmation or impeachment of rec-
ord testimony), and when prior recorded statements may be used
to refresh memory and when they can be admitted as a past recol-
lection recorded. In addition, the procedural rules applicable to
the admission of prior statements will be examined, including the
necessity of offering the entire statement and the requirement of
confronting the declarant with the prior statement as a prerequi-
site to its admission.
* J.D., LL.D. of the Philadelphia Bar
I. PRIOR STATEMENTS OF PARTIES
A. Who is a Party
The first step in analyzing the admissibility and effect of prior
statements of parties is to determine precisely who is considered a
"party" for these purposes. There are at least two situations when
the prior statements of a person not technically a party may be ad-
mitted and considered as if they were made by an actual party.
First: statements made by a real party in interest are admissible
against his nominal party. Thus, statements made by the bene-
ficiaries in a death action have been admitted,1 as have the state-
ments made by the decedent in an action by or against his estate. 2
It is questionable whether the statement of one who is merely a
nominal party can be admitted under the rules applicable to parties
with an interest.3 Secondly, statements by one not an actual party
are admissible as the statements of a party if they were authorized
under established principles of agency. However, the statements of
an agent are admissible only in limited circumstances: the general
rule is that such statements, not otherwise admissible through
another exception to the hearsay rule (such as the spontaneous
declaration exception), will not be admissible against his principal
or master.4 Exceptions to this rule will be found where there is
proof that (1) the declarer was especially authorized by his super-
ior to make the statement; (2) he was a general representative of
the principal having the management of the entire business; (3)
his admissions formed part of the consideration of a contract; or
(4) his action was ratified by his principal.5
However, authority to do an act or conduct a transaction does
not of itself include authority to make statements concerning the
transaction, and authority to make statements of fact does not in-
clude authority to make statements admitting liability based upon
such facts.0 Even a statement by a general representative, in order
1. Geelen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 400 Pa. 240, 245, 161 A.2d 595 (1960).
2. Rudisill v. Cordes, 333 Pa. 544, 549-50, 5 A.2d 217 (1939); Hughes
v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 176 Pa. 254, 259, 35 A. 190 (1896); Webb
v. Martin. 364 F.2d 229, 232 (3rd Cir. 1966).
3. Muzychuk v. Yellow Cab Co., 343 Pa. 335, 341, 22 A.2d 670 (1941).
Contra, Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa. 216 (1867); Mertz v. Detweiler, 8 W.&S.
376 (1845).
4. Bergen v. Lit Bros., 354 Pa. 535, 539, 47 A.2d 671 (1946); Anderson
v. London Guar. & Accident Co., 295 Pa. 368, 145 A.2d 431 (1929); Mil-
waukee Locomotive Mfg. Co. v. Point Marion Coal Co., 294 Pa. 238, 144 A.
100 (1928). Statements made by an agent are admissible against the em-
ployer if made as part of the res gestae. Michaels v. Tubbs, 221 Pa. Super.
255, 260 n.2, 289 A.2d 738 (1972) (citing cases).
5. Orluske v. Nash Pittsburgh Motors Co., 286 Pa. 170, 174, 133 A. 148
(1926), quoting McGrath v. Pennsylvania Sugar Co., 282 Pa. 265, 274,
127 A. 780 (1925). See also Burwell v. Crist, 373 F.2d 78, 80 (3rd Cir.
1967).
6. Campbell v. G.C. Murphy Co., 122 Pa. Super. 342, 186 A. 269
(1926); Giberson v. Patterson Mills Co., 174 Pa. 369, 34 A. 563 (1896).
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to be admissible, must be a valid admission, For example, an ac-
cusation of negligence addressed to an employe by the manager of
a store to which no response is made does not constitute an admis-
sion of liability which will bind the store.7 Similarly, the president
of a company has been held to have no authority to concede lia-
bility;8 nor will the statements of the operator of a vehicle, 9 the
superintendant of a business,10 the fiduciary of an estate," or the
spouse of a party' 2 be admitted as the statement or admission of a
party.
Of course, the declarations of agents may be admissible on
other grounds. Books and records of an agent, when corroborated
by other evidence, may be admitted.' 3 Declarations which are less
than admissions, made while the agent is performing an action
within the scope of his employment, may be admitted against the
principal so long as there is independent evidence of the agency
relationship. An example would be a statement by the agent of
the subject matter of his authority. 14 Furthermore, a prior state-
ment may become admissible upon proof that the agent had spe-
cific authority to make it or that the principal intended that the
agent should speak on his behalf.' 5 For example, judicial admis-
sions made by an attorney for a party in a pleading are admissi-
ble, however, statements made in a pretrial memorandum or out of
court, are not.' 6
In Burwell v. Crist,1 7 a state police officer investigating an ac-
cident was introduced to an employe by one of the defendants.
7. Smith v. American Stores Co., 156 Pa. Super. 375, 380, 40 A.2d 696
(1944).
8. Burns v. Flaherty Co., 278 Pa. 579, 581, 123 A. 496 (1924); Lombard
Street Ry. v. Christian, 124 Pa. 114, 123, 16 A. 628 (1889).
9. Deater v. Penn Machine Co., 311 Pa. 291, 295, 166 A. 846 (1933);
Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 508, 511 (3rd Cir. 1957). Of
course the statement of an agent not admissible as an admission can be
used to attack credibility. See text accompanying notes 66-68 infra.
10. McGrath v. Pennsylvania Sugar Co., 282 Pa. 265, 275, 127 A. 780
(1925); York Mfg. Co. v. Chelten Ice Mfg. Co., 278 Pa. 351, 357, 123 A. 327
(1924); Gilberson v. Patterson Mills Co., 174 Pa. 369, 372, 34 A. 563 (1896).
11. Compton v. Heilman, 331 Pa. 545, 549, 1 A.2d 682 (1938).
12. Evans v. Evans, 155 Pa. 572, 26 A. 755 (1893).
13. Dobbs v. Zink, 290 Pa. 243, 247, 138 A. 758 (1927); Stewart v. Cli-
max Road Machine Co., 200 Pa. 611, 612, 50 A. 1119 (1901).
14. Sebastianelli v. Cleland Simpson Co., 152 Pa. Super. 203, 207, 31
A.2d 570 (1943).
15. Burwell v. Crist, 373 F.2d 78 (3rd Cir. 1967).
16. Taylor v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 320 F. Supp. 1381, aff'd 436
F.2d 416 (3rd Cir. 1969); Conrad's Estate, 333 Pa. 561, 3 A.2d 697 (1938);
Geesey v. Albee Pennsylvania Homes, Inc., 211 Pa. Super. 215, 221-22,
235 A.2d 176 (1967).
17. 373 F.2d 78 (3rd Cir. 1967).
The officer questioned the employe (at least part of the time in the
presence of that defendant) and obtained a statement of the facts
from him. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overturned
a ruling that this statement was inadmissible, holding that the de-
fendant had constituted the employe his agent to speak on his be-
half. The court's sole local authority was Baker v. Westmoreland
& Cambria Natural Gas Co.'8 (The concurring opinion expressed
the view of a majority of the panel that the evidence should have
been submitted to the jury with instructions to consider it only if
they determined that the owner intended that the statements of
the employe be made on his behalf. 9 ) The Baker decision held
that the statement of the employe there involved was properly ad-
mitted as being one made "by a representative of the [defendant],
acting within the scope of his employment," but the grounds for
admission in the court below were (more properly, perhaps) that it
was a res gestae statement or one made as part of the verbal act of
the employe.2 °
In two other instances the declarations of one who is not a
party to the action may be admitted against a party as admissions
against him. The declarations of an alleged partner are admissible
to prove the existence of the partnership, and a statement by an
admitted partner is competent as an "admission by adoption."' 2'
Secondly, declarations of third persons called by a party as wit-
nesses in another action are admissible against the party if he is
bound thereby because of agency, joint or common interest, or his
having vouched for their credibility by calling them in the prior
action.
22
B. Admissible Statements by Parties
Basically, any prior statement made by a party to an action
may be offered by his opponent to prove any relevant fact. Its ad-
missibility is not subject to the hearsay rule, since the prior state-
ment consitutes an admission against interest.23  The statement
18. 157 Pa. 593, 27 A. 789 (1893).
19. Burwell v. Crist, 373 F.2d 78, 82 (3rd Cir. 1967) (concurring opin-
ion).
20. Cf. 6 WICMOHE, EVIDENCE § 1773.
21. Huron v. Schomaker, 123 Pa. Super. 82, 185 A. 859 (1936); Treon
v. Shipman & Son, 275 Pa. 246, 119 A. 74 (1922).
22. Zank v. West Penn Power Co., 169 Pa. Super. 164, 82 A.2d 554
(1951); Becker v. Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 344, 66 A. 564 (1907).
23. Lock Estate, 431 Pa. 251, 261, 244 A.2d 677 (1968); Bruno v.
Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 200 A.2d 405 (1964); Geelen v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
400 Pa. 240, 161 A.2d 595 (1960); Geiger v. Schneyer, 398 Pa. 69, 157 A.2d
56 (1959); Bizich v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 391 Pa. 640, 139 A.2d 663 (1958);
Gougher v. Hansler, 388 Pa. 160, 130 A.2d 160 (1957); Muzychuk v. Yellow
Cab Co., 343 Pa. 335, 341, 22 A.2d 670 (1941); Rudisill v. Cordes, 333 Pa.
544, 549, 5 A.2d 217 (1939); Braceland v. Hughes, 184 Pa. Super. 4, 133 A.2d
286 (1957).
Some of our decisions refer to "declarations against interest," a mis-
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may be oral 24 or written 25 and may have been made to the
other party,26 to a police officer, 27 to an investigator28 or to any
other person.29 A statement is admissible which has been given in
a deposition 30 or at the prior trial of the same action3 or at the
trial of another action. 2 It may be contained in a pleading 3 even
though the pleading was subsequently withdrawn, stricken, or
superseded by amendment.3 4  The extent to which an admission
nomer, e.g., Beardsley v. Weaver, 402 Pa. 130, 132, 166 A.2d 529 (1961);
Panik v. Didra, 370 Pa. 488, 494, 88 A.2d 730 (1952); Salvitti v. Throppe,
343 Pa. 642, 644, 23 A.2d 445 (1942); Smith v. Farver, 173 Pa. Super. 391,
394, 98 A.2d 249 (1953).
24. Perciavelle v. Smith, 434 Pa. 86, 89, 252 A.2d 702 (1969); Miller v.
Gault, 345 Pa. 474, 29 A.2d 71 (1942); Salvitti v. Throppe, 343 Pa. 642,
23 A.2d 445 (1942); Curry v. Riggles, 302 Pa. 156, 162, 153 A. 325 (1931);
Lyke v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 Pa. 38, 84 A. 595 (1912); Smith v. Farver,
173 Pa. Super. 391, 98 A.2d 249 (1953).
25. Bizich v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 391 Pa. 640, 139 A.2d 663 (1958);
Lemmon v. Bufalino, 204 Pa. Super. 481, 484, 205 A.2d 680 (1964).
26. Perciavelle v. Smith, 434 Pa. 86, 252 A.2d 702 (1969); Bizich v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 391 Pa. 640, 139 A.2d 663 (1958); Salvitti v. Throppe,
343 Pa. 642, 23 A.2d 445 (1942).
27. Auerbach v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 421 Pa. 594, 603, 221 A.2d
163 (1966); Mitchell v. Shirey, 407 Pa. 204, 180 A.2d 65 (1962); Geiger v.
Schneyer, 398 Pa. 69, 157 A.2d 56 (1959); Panik v. Didra, 370 Pa. 488, 88
A.2d 730 (1952); Smith v. Farver, 173 Pa. Super. 391, 98 A.2d 249 (1953).
28. Beardsley v. Weaver, 402 Pa. 130, 166 A.2d 529 (1961); Fleischman
v. Reading, 388 Pa. 183, 130 A.2d 426 (1957); Gougher v. Hansler, 388 Pa.
160, 130 A.2d 150 (1957); Whitfield v. Reading Co., 380 Pa. 566, 112 A.2d
113 (1955); Brueckner v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 554, 84 A.2d 197 (1951);
Brenner v. Lesher, 332 Pa. 522, 2 A.2d 731 (1938); Lemmon v. Bufalino,
204 Pa. Super. 481, 484, 205 A.2d 680 (1964).
29. Perciavelle v. Smith, 434 Pa. 86, 252 A.2d 702 (1969); Bizich v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 391 Pa. 640, 139 A.2d 663 (1958); Lyke v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 236 Pa. 38, 84 A. 595 (1912).
30. Bruno v. Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 363, 200 A.2d 405 (1964); Greater
Valley Terminal Corp. v. Goodman, 405 Pa. 605, 608, 176 A.2d 445 (1962)
(not conclusive unless clear and unequivocal).
31. Bruno v. Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 200 A.2d 405 (1964); Little v. Straw,
326 Pa. 577, 192 A.2d 894 (1937); Foglia v. Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 119 Pa.
Super. 94, 97, 179 A.2d 871 (1935).
32. Webb v. Martin, 364 F.2d 229, 232 (3rd Cr. 1966); Morse Boulger
Destructor Co. v. Arnoni, 376 Pa. 57, 101 A.2d 705 (1954); Muzychuk v.
Yellow Cab Co., 343 Pa. 335, 341, 22 A.2d 670 (1941); Ham v. Gouge,
214 Pa. Super. 423, 428, 237 A.2d 650 (1969).
33. Tops Apparel Mfg. Co. v. Rothman, 430 Pa. 583, 587, 244 A.2d 436
(1968); Bruno v. Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 200 A.2d 405 (1964); Morse Boulger
Destructor Co. v. Arnoni, 376 Pa. 57, 101 A.2d 705 (1954); Giles v. Valentic,
355 Pa. 108, 110, 49 A.2d 384 (1946); Quartz v. Pittsburgh, 340 Pa. 277,
16 A.2d 400 (1940); Melnick v. Melnick, 154 Pa. Super. 481, 36 A.2d 235
(1943).
34. Monaco v. Gula, 407 Pa. 522, 180 A.2d 893 (1962); Commonwealth
by Truscott v. Binenstock, 366 Pa. 519, 77 A.2d 628 (1951); Easton School
Dist v. Continental Cas. Co., 304 Pa. 67, 72, 155 A. 93 (1931); Braceland v.
Hughes, 184 Pa. Super. 47, 133 A.2d 286 (1957).
made in an answer in trespass is admissible is circumscribed by
the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 However, an admis-
sion in the pleadings of another action36 or in answers to interroga-
tories does not estop the party from taking a different position in a
subsequent independent suit.3 7 A self-serving answer to an inter-
rogatory may not be used even though the answering party has
died.38 There is no requirement that the prior statement be made
from personal knowledge,3 9 nor that it be a statement of fact-an
expression of opinion is equally admissible where the declarant has
adequate knowledge to form an opinion. 40 If the original of a writ-
ten statement has been lost, a copy may be used if the court is sat-
isfied that it is authentic.
41
C. Offering the Statement in Evidence
One of the major differences between the use at trial of prior
statements made by witnesses and those made by parties is the
broader range of trial tactics which may be employed when dealing
with the introduction of the latter. Contrary to the rule applicable
to use of the prior statements of ordinary witnesses, 42 it is not nec-
essary to confront a party with his prior statement in order to lay
the groundwork for its admission.43 Trial strategy may dictate
such confrontation in some circumstances, however. If the oppos-
ing party is confronted directly with the statement on cross-exami-
nation and he admits having made the statement, it will obviate the
necessity for authentication of the statement in the offering party's
case. In rare instances a plaintiff may even be persuaded to adopt
35. Rosenson v. Lyle, 436 Pa. 354, 261 A.2d 681 (1970); Pa. R. Civ. P.
1045 (a).
36. Ham v. Gouge, 214 Pa. Super. 423, 428, 257 A.2d 650 (1969); Lapa-
yowker v. Lincoln College Preparatory School, 386 Pa. 167, 176, 125 A.2d
451 (1956) ; Barclay v. Barclay, 230 Pa. 467, 471, 79 A. 667 (1911).
37. Cerino v. Philadelphia, 435 Pa. 355, 257 A.2d 571 (1969) (self-
serving answers); 'Bruno v. Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 200 A.2d 405 (1964).
38. Cerino v. Philadelphia, 435 Pa. 355, 257 A.2d 571 (1969) (sub
silentio); Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 281, 290 (1868). But see dissenting
opinion in Cerino, 435 Pa. at 360 and Treharne v. Callahan, 426 F.2d 58
(3rd Cir. 1970). Cf. Deremiki v. Pennsylvania R.R., 353 F.2d 436, 443 (3rd
Cir. 1965).
39. Salvitti v. Throppe, 343 Pa. 642, 644, 23 A.2d 445 (1942); cf. Shell
v. Parish, 448 F.2d 528 (1971); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 1048.
40. Beardsley v. Weaver, 402 Pa. 130, 133, 166 A.2d 529 (1961). But
see Starner v. Wirth, 440 Pa. 177, 181, 269 A.2d 674 (1970). Even an ad-
mission of a party which is based upon hearsay may be admissible against
him, although he must be given an opportunity to explain it, cf. Shell v.
Parrish, 448 F.2d 528 (3rd Cir. 1971).
41. Brenner v. Lesher, 332 Pa. 522, 2 A.2d 731 (1938).
42. See text accompanying notes 101-102 infra.
43. Geelen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 400 Pa. 240, 246, 161 A.2d 595 (1960);
Bizich v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 391 Pa. 640, 644, 139 A.2d 663 (1958);
Kreiter v. Bomberger, 82 Pa. 59, 61 (1876). Grzywacz v. Meszaros, 417
Pa. 51, 52, 208 A.2d 237 (1965), and Giles v. Valentic, 355 Pa. 108, 110, 49




his contradictory previous statement as his final testimony and be
nonsuited. However, the contradiction in the opposing party's
case may have greater jury impact if it is reserved for presentation
in the offering party's case in chief. When the statement is used
in this manner its main purpose is for impeachment; however, its
effect as substantive evidence is not diminished.
When authentication is sought by confrontation and the maker
admits his signature to the statement and does not deny the truth
of its contents, the statement is admissible even though the maker
has testified to no positive facts which are contradicted by the
statement.44 Where the party denies the contents, even though he
admits the signature, the statement becomes admissible upon proof
of the authenticity of its contents.
45
One who offers the prior non-judicial statement of an opposing
party must take the bad with the good. The entire statement must
be introduced, even when it contains matter which is unfavorable
to the offeror which would constitute self-serving statements, if
sought to be placed in evidence independently by the maker of the
statement.
4"
The effect of the offer of the entire statement will vary with
the circumstances. Ordinarily the principle stated in Heyman v.
Hanauer will apply:
But where, as here, admissions against interest and self-
serving declarations are found in the same writing, and
the other party wishes to take advantage of the admissions,
it becomes necessary to offer the whole of the writing,
even though part of it may contain matter favorable to the
party making it: Yearsley's App., 48 Pa. 531, 534 (1865).
However, parts against his interest are entitled to greater
weight than those in his favor (Greenawalt v. McEnelley,
85 Pa. 352, 356 (1877)), and the jury may believe the admis-
sions against himself and yet refuse to credit the state-
ments in his own interest (Thommon v. Kalbach, 12 S.&R.
44. Beardsley v. Weaver, 402 Pa. 130, 132, 166 A.2d 529 (1961); Gee-
len v. Pennsylvania R.R., 400 Pa. 240, 161 A.2d 595 (1960). Failure to offer
admission in pleadings not fatal where trial proceeded as if it were ad-
mitted: Skocich v. F.J. Boutell Driveaway Co., 317 Pa. 26, 176 A. 19 (1935).
45. Brueckner v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 554, 84 A.2d 197 (1951); Lenmon
v. Bufalino, 204 Pa. Super. 481, 484, 205 A.2d 680 (1964); Seckinger v.
Economy Laundry, Inc., 133 Pa. Super. 414, 418, 3 A.2d 46 (1938); Denial of
initials on first page of statement, Grossman v. U.S. Slicing Machine Co.,
365 F.2d 687 (3rd Cir. 1966).
46. Jones v. Spidle, 446 Pa. 103, 108, 286 A.2d 366 (1971); Cooper's Es-
tate, 320 Pa. 418, 420, 183 A. 45 (1936); Heyman v. Hanauer, 302 Pa. 56, 61,
152 A. 910 (1930); Dougherty v. Pennypack Woods Home, 181 Pa. Super.
121, 127, 124 A.2d 703 (1956); Hensel v. Cahill, 179 Pa. Super. 114, 118,
116 A.2d 99 (1955).
238, 239 (1825)) ; and the party offering an admission is not
bound by self-serving declarations contained in the offer,
but may introduce evidence to disprove them Yearsley's
App., supra.
47
Our courts have not attempted to reconcile the decision in
Miller v. Gault48 with this principle. In Miller a witness called by
the plaintiff testified concerning several statements made by the
defendant which were quite damaging to the plaintiff. Counsel for
the plaintiff argued that the plaintiff should not be bound by the
testimony of the defendant's utterances. The court ruled that the
plaintiff put the defendant's statements in evidence and they were
in for all purposes, precisely as they would have been if the plain-
tiff had called the defendant for cross-examination.
49
The dissenting opinion in Miller strongly argues that Miller
and Heyman are not reconcilable and that the majority opinion is
an unjustified departure from the Heyman principle. 50 However,
the Heyman principle has been applied only to written documents"1
and, if so confined, there is a basis for reconciliation and accept-
ance of both precedents.
When the prior statement was made in a judicial proceeding,
the requirement that the entire testimony of the party be offered
by his opponent is not strictly imposed. The offeror need offer
only those portions of the testimony which constitute admissions
against interest; but he may be required to read additional portions
of the statement which qualify or modify the parts offered. If
the offeror fails to place the statement in its proper context, the
opposing party may do so. 52 Where the admission is contained in
an answering pleading, the entire statement need not be offered if
it contains matter by way of avoidance or defense, but a qualified
admission may not be segregated from its stated conditions.59
D. The Evidentiary Impact of Prior Statements by Parties
When a prior statement of a party is introduced against him it
becomes substantive evidence in the case,14 even if offered solely
47. 302 Pa. 56, 62, 152 A. 910 (1930). See also Cooper's Estate, 320 Pa.
418, 183 A. 45 (1936).
48. 345 Pa. 474, 29 A.2d 71 (1942). See also Geiger v. Schneyer,
398 Pa. 69, 74, 157 A.2d 56 (1959).
49. Miller v. Gault, 345 Pa. 474, 479, 29 A.2d 71 (1942).
50. Id. at 484 (dissenting opinion, Maxey, J. distinguishing cases in
which a party calls his adversary for cross-examination and is, therefore,
bound by his testimony if uncontradicted). Cf. Geiger v. Schneyer, 398
Pa. 69, 157 A.2d 56 (1959) (proof of statement of adverse party not con-
tradicted).
51. See Brandeis v. Charter Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 149 Pa. Super. 545,
549, 27 A.2d 425 (1942); Thommon v. Kalbach, 12 S. & R. 238 (1825).
52. Weaver v. Welsh, 325 Pa. 571, 575, 191 A. 3 (1937).
53. Melnick v. Melnick, 154 Pa. Super. 481, 491, 36 A.2d 235 (1943).
54. Mitchell v. Shirey, 407 Pa. 204, 180 A.2d 65 (1962); Geelen v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 400 Pa. 240, 245, 161 A.2d 595 (1960); Geiger v. Schneyer,
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for impeachment." As such, the content of a defendant's prior
statement may constitute a substantial, even an essential, element
of a plaintiff's case. 56 If the prior statement is not explained or
denied and remains uncontroverted, a clear and unequivocal ad-
mission may properly be used to support a finding of fact 57 and
may even support the direction of a verdict for the party offering
the statement of his opponent. 58 It is the duty of the trial judge to
instruct the jury on the effect of the statement 9 and it is reversible
error for the judge to limit the statement's purpose, 60 a principle
which is sometimes overlooked.01
A prior statement in a pleading in the action being tried is con-
clusive upon the party who made it; however, where the admission
was made in a pleading in another action or in a superseded plead-
ing in the same action it may be explained or contradicted.
62
When an offer of a prior statement of a party has been made and
received, the party must be given the opportunity to explain the
meaning of or the reason for the admissions made therein,63 or to
repudiate the statement entirely. 4 The party confronted with
contradictions contained in a prior inconsistent statement is per-
mitted to have his case determined by whichever statement he fi-
nally says is true. Nevertheless, prior statements of a party which
are clear and unequivocal may be sufficient of themselves to sup-
port a finding against that party,65 and the contradictions, even
398 Pa. 69, 73, 157 A.2d 56 (1959); Bizich v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 391 Pa.
640, 644, 139 A.2d 663 (1958); Gougher v. Hansler, 388 Pa. 160, 166, 130
A.2d 150 (1957); Lemmon v. Bufalino, 204 Pa. Super. 481, 485, 205 A.2d
680 (1964); Braceland v. Hughes, 184 Pa. Super. 4, 6, 133 A.2d 286 (1957).
55. Morse Boulger Destructor Co. v. Arnoni, 376 Pa. 57, 65, 101 A.2d
705 (1954).
56. Perciavelle v. Smith, 434 Pa. 86, 89, 252 A.2d 702 (1969); Geiger
v. Schneyer, 398 Pa. 69, 157 A.2d 56 (1959).
57. Gougher v. Hansler, 388 Pa. 160, 166, 130 A.2d 150 (1957).
58. Miller v. Gault, 345 Pa. 474, 477, 29 A.2d 71 (1942). But see dis-
senting opinion at 484. Geiger v. Schneyer, 398 Pa. 69, 74, 157 A.2d 56
(1959).
59. Mitchell v. Shirey, 407 Pa. 204, 180 A.2d 65 (1962).
60. Geiger v. Schneyer, 398 Pa. 69, 157 A.2d 56 (1959).
61. Cf. Grzywacz v. Meszaros, 417 Pa. 51, 52, 208 A.2d 237 (1965).
62. Gougher v. Hansler, 388 Pa. 160, 130 A.2d 150 (1957); Ham v.
Gouge, 214 Pa. Super. 423, 428, 237 A.2d 650 (1969); Easton School Dist. v.
Continental Cas. Co., 304 Pa. 67, 72, 155 A. 93 (1931).
63. Geelen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 400 Pa. 240, 191 A.2d 595 (1960);
Fleischman v. Reading, 388 Pa. 183, 130 A.2d 429 (1957); Quartz v. Pitts-
burgh, 340 Pa. 277, 279, 16 A.2d 400 (1940).
64. Lemmon v. Bufalino, 204 Pa. Super. 481, 485, 205 A.2d 680 (1964);
Fleischman v. Reading, 388 Pa. 183, 130 A.2d 429 (1957); Lambert v. Po-
len, 346 Pa. 352, 355, 30 A.2d 115 (1943); Seckinger v. Economy Laundry,
Inc., 133 Pa. Super. 414, A.2d 46 (1938).
65. Beardsley v. Weaver, 402 Pa. 130, 133, 166 A.2d 529 (1961);
though explained, may be sufficient to justify the grant of a new
trial after a verdict in favor of the party who is so contradicted.
In addition to providing substantive evidence, the credibility of
a party, as well as any other witness, may be attacked by his prior
inconsistent statements.6 6 Even when offered solely for impeach-
ment, however, a party's prior statement may be considered for
any purpose for which it is competent and, therefore, may be used
as substantive evidence.07 The definition of "collateral matter,"
which may not be inquired into when testing the credibility of a
witness by way of his prior statements, may be relaxed when deal-
ing with a party if it may reveal the party's lack of candor or hon-
esty, or demonstrate an inclination to exaggerate or the like.68
IL PRioR STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
Prior statements made by individuals who are not parties to
the action, whether available to testify or not, are ordinarily not
admissible because of the hearsay rule. However, in addition to
the recognized spontaneous declaration exception to the rule, there
are other circumstances in which prior statements may be admit-
ted.
A. Admissible Prior Statements
1. Prior judicial testimony
Under limited circumstances the testimony of a witness which
was given in a prior judicial proceeding may be admitted as sub-
stantive evidence on behalf of either party in a later action. Subse-
quent use of prior judicial testimony was permitted at common
law 69 and its admission is currently governed by the provisions of
the Act of 1887:
Whenever any person has been examined as a witness in
any civil proceeding before any tribunal of this common-
wealth or conducted by virtue of its order or direction if
such witness afterwards die, or be out of the jurisdiction so
that he cannot be effectively served with a subpoena, or if
he cannot be found, or if he becomes incompetent to testify
for any legally sufficient reason, and if the party, against
whom notes of the testimony of such witness are offered,
had actual or constructive notice of the examination and
an opportunity to be present and examine or cross-ex-
amine, properly proven notes of the examination of such
Dougherty v. Pennypeck Woods Home, 181 Pa. Super. 121, 128, 124 A.2d
703 (1956). Subject to the general principle that a party is not bound even
by his own testimony in certain areas: cf. Readinger v. Gottschall, 201
Pa. Super. 134, 139, 191 A.2d 694 (1963).
66. Morse Boulger Destructor Co. v. Arnoni, 376 Pa. 57, 65, 101 A.2d
705 (1954).
67. Id.
68. Bruno v. Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 364, 200 A.2d 405 (1964).
69. Lock Estate, 431 Pa. 251, 260, 244 A.2d 677 (1968).
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witness shall be competent evidence in any civil issue
which may exist at the time of his examination, or which
may be afterwards formed between the same parties and
involving the same subject-matter as that upon which such
witness was so examined; but for the purpose of contradict-
ing a witness, the testimony given by him in another, a
former proceeding, may be orally proved.70
The use of previous testimony is strictly limited to situations
in which the witness is not available to testify for one of the rea-
sons set forth.71 When the previous testimony was given in an-
other proceeding it must appear that it was a civil proceeding;
that the party against whom it is offered had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness at the time it was given, that the subject
matter is the same and that there is substantial identity of parties
and issues in the two proceedings. There is no requirement that
the form of the proceeding, the theory of the case, or the nature of
the relief sought, be the same. Nor is the character of the tribunal
in the prior proceeding material.7 2 Of course, even if the prior
testimony is found inadmissible because it does not fulfill all of
the requirements of the statute, it may still be admissible under
another exception to the hearsay rule, such as an admission against
interest made by a party in a prior proceeding which was not a civil
proceeding. Such prior testimony may be proved in many ways,
including introduction of the prior judicial transcript or direct
testimony by one who was present at the prior tribunal and heard
the testimony given.73 A similar rule applies to the use of testi-
70. Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, § 9, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 327.
A similar provision is made for criminal cases: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 582, cf. Commonwealth v. Crosby, 444 Pa. 17, 279 A.2d 73 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Clarkson, 438 Pa. 523, 265 A.2d 802 (1970).
71. Commonwealth ex rel. Huff v. Memolo, 170 Pa. Super. 49, 51, 82
A.2d 764 (1951). The nature of the proof required rests in the discretion of
the court: Delvitto v. Schiavo, 370 Pa. 299, 302, 87 A.2d 913 (1952); Cf.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 495. Incompetent to testify: Lock Estate, 431
Pa. 251, 244 A.2d 677 (1968); Death: Nestor v. George, 354 Pa. 19, 23, 46
A.2d 469 (1946); Sickness: Shields v. Larry Constr. Co., 370 Pa. 582, 88
A.2d 764 (1952); Aged and infirm: Thornton v. Britton, 144 Pa. 126, 131,
22 A. 1048 (1891); Loss of Memory: Rothrock v. Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108, 112
(1879); Unavailable-out of jurisdiction: Watsontown Brick Co. v. Her-
cules Powder Co., 265 F. Supp. 268, 276 (M.D. Pa.) aff'd., 387 F.2d 99 (3rd
Cir. 1967); Delvitto v. Schiavo, 370 Pa. 299, 303, 87 A.2d 913 (1952); Giber-
son v. Patterson Mills Co., 187 Pa. 513, 41 A. 525 (1898); Almar Bldg. and
Loan Ass'n v. Broad St. Trust Co., 116 Pa. Super. 465, 470, 176 A. 767 (1935).
72. Lock Estate, 431 Pa. 251, 244 A.2d 677 (1968); American Trust Co.
v. Kaufman, 287 Pa. 461, 468, 135 A. 210 (1926); Nixon Estate, 104 Pa.
Super. 506, 510, 159 A. 172 (1931).
73. Stenographer may read from his notes provided he testifies they
were correctly taken: Commonwealth v. Carter, 187 Pa. Super. 159, 164,
144 A.2d 493 (1958); but his transcript is not per se admissible, Ingram
mony of a witness given in a discovery deposition in the same case
who is unavailable to testify at trial. 1
2. Prior contradictory statements
Prior statements may also be used in certain circumstances to
attack the credibility of opposing witnesses and bolster the credi-
bility of favorable witnesses. Any statement previously made by
a witness concerning a material fact to which he has testified may
be introduced to contradict the witness and thereby diminish his
credibility. 75  If the contradiction between the witness's prior
statement and his in-court testimony is direct, admission of the
prior statement is not subject to the discretion of the trial judge.7
A statement used for this purpose may be oral or written, and
need not have been made in a prior judicial proceeding.77 How-
ever, hearsay evidence of such a statement may not be used to
contradict or impeach the witness.7 8
The use of a witness's prior inconsistent statements for im-
peachment purposes is limited by the general rule applicable to all
attempts to discredit a witness: a witness may not be impeached
through cross-examination on matters not germane to the issue in-
volved, unless such matters were first introduced during direct ex-
amination. 79 In order to prevent the trial from becoming confused
through the introduction of collateral matters, the facts upon
which the witness is sought to be contradicted must be material
and relevant. However, a direct contradiction is not necessary to
attack credibility, and a prior statement showing any material vari-
ance in the -witness's testimony will suffice. In one decision,
Bruno v. Brown, 0 this principle was broadened to permit cross-
v. Pittsburgh, 346 Pa. 45, 47, 29 A.2d 32 (1942), unless he is an official court
stenographer: Act of 1907 P.L. 135, § 5, 1911 P.L. 279, § 4. Calling the
magistrate or other persons present: Commonwealth v. Neff, 149 Pa. Super.
513, 515, 27 A.2d 737 (1942); persons who heard him testify if no notes
taken: Wolfe v. Scott, 275 Pa. 343, 346, 119 A. 468 (1923); and even the
personal notes of counsel if he testifies that they are complete: Phila-
delphia and Reading R.R. v. Spearen, 47 Pa. 300, 306 (1864).
74. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1020.
75. DeJohn v. Orell, 429 Pa. 359, 363, 240 A.2d 472 (1968); Auerbach
v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 421 Pa. 594, 603, 221 A.2d 163 (1966); Bizich v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 391 Pa. 640, 645, 139 A.2d 663 (1958); Wolansky v.
Lawson, 389 Pa. 477, 479, 133 A.2d 843 (1957); Commonwealth v. Rothman,
168 Pa. Super. 163, 165, 77 A.2d 731 (1951); Commonwealth v. Blose, 160
Pa. Super. 165, 171, 50 A.2d 742 (1947).
76. DeJohn v. Orell, 429 Pa. 359, 240 A.2d 472 (1968); Commonwealth
v. Rothman, 168 Pa. Super. 163, 77 A.2d 731 (1951).
77. DeJohn v. Orell, 429 Pa. 359, 240 A.2d 472 (1968). As to prior
depositions, see Puskarich v. Trustees of Zembo Temple, 412 Pa. 313, 318,
194 A.2d 208 (1963); Pa. R. Civ. P. 1020 (a) (1).
78. Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa. Super. 430, 435, 62 A.2d 75 (1948); Selden v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 506, 43 A.2d 571 (1945).
79. Zubrod v. Kuhn, 357 Pa. 200, 203, 53 A.2d 604 (1947); cf. Common-
wealth v. Petrillo, 341 Pa. 209, 223, 19 A.2d 288 (1941) as to what is "col-
lateral."
80. 414 Pa. 361, 200 A.2d 405 (1964).
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examination which did not contradict the witness's instant testi-
mony but tended to show that the witness was "capable of making
errors.""' However, in McGoldrick v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.8
2
the court disapproved the language of Bruno and ruled that while
the admission of collateral matters for the purposes of contradic-
tion should normally be left to the trial judge, if the collateral con-
tradiction concerns a matter which is "unreasonably prejudicial to
one of the parties, the trial court abuses its discretion by permitting
the contradiction."
8 3
A further limitation on counsel's right to attack the credibility
of a witness through the introduction of a prior inconsistent state-
ment is the requirement that the witness's original testimony
must have been harmful to his cause. If the witness has not said
anything damaging to a party, there is no need to contradict him.8 4
In addition to their admissibility against opposing witnesses to
show lack of credibility, prior inconsistent statements are also ad-
missible against a party's own witness in certain circumstances. A
prior statement may be used to contradict and impeach a party's
own witness called for cross-examination s or upon a plea of sur-
prise 6 or a showing of hostility in some cases. 8 T However, before
the testimony of such a witness may be contradicted, it must be
damaging 8 and there must have been actual surprise.8 9 The req-
uisites for a plea of surprise, the manner in which the plea should
be made, and the substance of the plea are fully considered in Sel-
den v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.90
81. Id. at 365, 200 A.2d at 407, citing 3 WIGMOIE, EVIDENCE, § 1017 at
684-85.
82. 430 Pa. 597, 241 A.2d 90 (1968).
83. Id. at 601, 241 A.2d at 93.
84. Goodis v. Gimbel Bros., 420 Pa. 439, 218 A.2d 574 (1966); Bryzy-
wacz v. Meszaros, 417 Pa. 51, 52, 208 A.2d 232 (1965); Commonwealth v.
Knudsen, 443 Pa. 412, 415, 278 A.2d 881 (1971); Selden v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 509, 43 A.2d 571 (1945). Contra, Bruno v.
Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 364, 200 A.2d 405 (1964).
85. Crawford v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 208 Pa. Super. 150, 162, 221
A.2d 877 (1966).
86. Bizich v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 391 Pa. 640, 139 A.2d 663 (1958);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 424 Pa. 544, 548, 277 A.2d 653 (1967) (rule re-
laxed to prevent injustice). But surprise must be shown: Selden v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 505, 43 A.2d 571 (1945).
87. Cf. Commonwealth v. Bartell, 184 Pa. Super. 528, 544, 136 A.2d
166 (1957).
88. Commonwealth v. Knudsen, 443 Pa. 412, 415, 278 A.2d 881
(1971); Goodis v. Gimbel Bros., 420 Pa. 439, 442, 218 A.2d 574 (1966).
89. Goodis v. Gimbel Bros., 420 Pa. 439, 218 A.2d 574 (1966); Selden v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 48 A.2d 591 (1957).
90. 157 Pa. Super. 500, 48 A.2d 591 (1957). See also Commonwealth
v. Smith, 178 Pa. Super. 251, 255, 115 A.2d 782 (1955).
When a witness has not been attacked or impeached, his prior
consistent statements are inadmissible. However, when a witness
has been attacked by the use of prior inconsistent statement or by
evidence tending to prove that his testimony is recently contrived,
or by any other attack on his credibility, the party offering the wit-
ness may be entitled to rehabilitate him by proving his prior con-
sonant statements.
9 1
The consonant statement must be consistent with his present
testimony.9 2 It has been urged that the introduction of a prior
consistent statement does nothing to eliminate the contradiction
between his testimony and his earlier inconsistent statement,93 but
this argument is rejected by Wigmore94 and most courts by asking
the question: "But is it a proved fact that he has uttered the self-
contradiction? And may not the consistency of his other state-
ments help with the jury to controvert the testimony that he did
utter the contradiction?" When the inconsistent statement is not
explained or denied, there would appear to be no justification for
admitting the consonant statement. But this situation seldom oc-
curs. The question usually raised is whether the testimony
proving an inconsistent statement is to be believed. Because of
this, inquiry must sometimes be made as to when the prior con-
sonant statement was made. Whether a time limitation should be
imposed is an open question;95 Wigmore refuses to limit the princi-
ple to consistent statements made before the self-contradiction.9 6
This limitation, frequently alluded to and sometimes applied, has
validity if the self-contradiction is urged solely on the ground that
the testimony at trial is recently contrived.9 7 On this basis the
principle might also be justifiably limited to admit only consistent
statements made before a motive to falsify existed. If the same
reason to lie existed at the time the consonant statement was made
that formed the basis for the charge of recent fabrication, it would
91. Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192 (3rd Cir. 1970); Common-
wealth v. Wilson, 431 Pa. 21, 244 A.2d 734 (1968); Commonwealth v.
Vento, 410 Pa. 350, 353, 189 A.2d 161 (1963); Keefer v. Byers, 398 Pa. 447,
450, 159 A.2d 477 (1960); Risbon v. Cottom, 387 Pa. 155, 160, 127 A.2d 101
(1956); Lyke v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 Pa. 38, 48, 84 A. 595 (1912); Com-
monwealth v. Marino, 213 Pa. Super. 88, 102, 245 A.2d 868 (1968); Com-
monwealth v. Friedman, 193 Pa. Super. 640, 647, 165 A.2d 678 (1960); Com-
monwealth v. Bartell, 184 Pa. Super. 528, 542, 136 A.2d 166 (1957).
92. Commonwealth v. Peterman, 430 Pa. 627, 635, 244 A.2d 723
(1968).
93. Craig v. Craig, 5 Rawle 91, 97-98 (1835).
94. 4 WIGMoRE, EvmENrcE § 1126.
95. Risbon v. Cottom, 387 Pa. 155, 168, 127 A.2d 101 (1956); see con-
curring opinion distinguishing Lyke v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 Pa. 38, 84
A.2d 595 (1912).
96. Risbon v. Cottom, 387 Pa. 155, 127 A.2d 101 (1956); -Common-
wealth v. Bartell, 184 Pa. Super. 528, 136 A.2d 166 (1957).
97. 4 WIcMoRE, EvIDENCE § 1129; Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d




appear that nothing of value is added by admission of the con-
sistent statement. But where the witness's explanation of his
statement is corroborated by the consonant statement, there is rea-
sonable basis for a ruling admitting the latter.9 8
For the same reasons, our courts have approved the admission
of consonant statements where witnesses have been sought to be
impeached or discredited by cross-examination generally, without
reference to inconsistent statements.9 9 Again, the admission of
such statements lies within the sound discretion of the trial
judge.
100
B. Placing the Statement in Evidence
Contrary to the rule applicable to statements of parties, the
prior statement of a witness may not be used or proved until the
witness is confronted with it and given an opportunity to confirm
or deny making it,1° 1 although this requirement is usually said to
lie within the discretion of the trial judge. 10 2 If the prior state-
ment is written and the witness admits signing it, it may be of-
fered in evidence even though he denies some or all of its con-
tents.1 3 If the statement is oral and the witness does not deny
making it, there is no need to produce the person to whom it was
made. 04 However, when the witness denies signing a written
statement or making an oral statement, or states that he does not
recall doing so, the opponent is required to produce proof that it
was made. 0 5 Proof that the statement was made may come in
98. Commonwealth v. Bartell, 184 Pa. Super. 528, 136 A.2d 166 (1957).
99. Commonwealth v. Patskin, 372 Pa. 402, 93 A.2d 704 (1953);
Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304 (1936); Common-
wealth v. Friedman, 193 Pa. Super. 640, 165 A.2d 678 (1960); Common-
wealth v. Bartell, 184 Pa. Super. 528, 136 A.2d 166 (1957).
100. Commonwealth v. Bartell, 184 Pa. Super. 528, 136 A.2d 166 (1957);
Lyke v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 Pa. 38, 84 A. 595 (1912).
101. Quartz v. Pittsburgh, 340 Pa. 277, 279, 16 A.2d 400 (1940); Com-
monwealth v. Carter, 187 Pa. Super. 159, 164, 144 A.2d 493 (1958); Common-
wealth v. Bartell, 184 Pa. Super. 528, 539, 136 A.2d 166 (1957); Herr v. Erb,
163 Pa. Super., 430, 62 A.2d 75 (1948). Cf. Harrah v. Montour R.R., 321
Pa. 526, 527, 184 A. 666 (1936).
102. Giles v. Valentic, 355 Pa. 108, 110, 49 A.2d 384 (1946); Harrah v.
Montour R.R., 321 Pa. 526, 184 A. 666 (1936); Marshall v. Carr, 275 Pa. 86,
89, 118 A. 621 (1922); Commonwealth v. Rothman, 168 Pa. Super. 163, 166,
77 A.2d 731 (1951).
103. Mitchell v. Shirey, 407 Pa. 204, 208, 180 A.2d 65 (1962); Beardsley
v. Weaver, 402 Pa. 130, 166 A.2d 529 (1961); Hughes v. Delaware & Hudson
Canal Co., 176 Pa. 254, 259. 35 A. 190 (1896).
104. Auerbach v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 421 Pa. 594, 603, 221 A.2d
163 (1966).
105. Geelen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 400 Pa. 240, 246, 161 A.2d 595
any manner,10 8 and the issue of whether the statement was made is
for the jury.10 7 The jury is permitted to know that the statement
was taken by an insurance company investigator,10 8 except when
the veracity of the scrivener is not in issue.10 9 When the alleged
contradiction is contained in testimony given in a former proceed-
ing, it may be orally proved under the Act of 1887; however, fair-
ness requires that the stenographer's notes be transcribed,
When a prior statement is produced for the purpose of contra-
'diction, the witness is entitled to read the entire statement and the
offeror is required to offer it in its entirety, except where prejudice
will result. Subject to the same exception, the opponent is en-
titled to put in evidence the entire statement if he so desires, if
the same is relevant, explanatory or will aid in construction.110
C. Evidentiary Impact of Prior Statements
When either a prior inconsistent or consonant statement of a
witness (including the party's witness, on a plea of surprise or one
called for cross-examination) is admitted, its sole purpose and ef-
fect is to attack or support the credibility of the witness.'1 ' Its
contents do not become substantive evidence in the case. An ap-
parent exception may exist in the rare instance in which the wit-
ness recants during the trial and testifies that the content of the
prior statement is true and that his present testimony is untrue,
1"2
(1960); Fleischman v. Reading, 388 Pa. 183, 130 A.2d 421 (1957); Lemmon
v. Bufalino, 204 Pa. Super. 481, 484, 205 A.2d 680 (1964).
106. Bruno v. Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 364, 200 A.2d 405 (1964); Gougher v.
Hansler, 388 Pa. 160, 164, 130 A.2d 150 (1957); Brueckner v. Pittsburgh,
368 Pa. 554, 557, 84 A.2d 197 (1951).
107. Williams v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 415 Pa. 370, 374, 203 A.2d
665 (1964).
108. Goddis v. Gimbel Bros., 420 Pa. 439, 444, 218 A.2d 574 (1966);
Lemmon v. Bufalino, 204 Pa. Super. 481, 485, 205 A.2d 680 (1964). See also
Fleischman v. Reading, 388 Pa. 183, 189-91, 130 A.2d 429 (1957) (dissenting
opinion).
109. Beardsley v. Weaver, 402 Pa. 130, 134, 166 A.2d 529 (1960); Gee-
len v. Pennsylvania R.R., 400 Pa. 240, 161 A.2d 595 (1960); Fleischman v.
Reading, 383 Pa. 183, 130 A.2d 429 (1957).
110. Capozi v. Hearst Publishing Co., 371 Pa. 503, 518, 92 A.2d 177
(1952); Cary v. Cary, 189 Pa. 65, 42 A. 19 (1899). See also 7 WiaMoaE, EVI-
DENCE § 2113.
111. Contrary to that of a party, see text accompanying notes 54-61
supra. Wilson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 421 Pa. 419, 431, 219 A.2d 666 (1966);
Goodis v. Gimbel Bros., 420 Pa. 439, 218 A.2d 574 (1966); Bizich v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 391 Pa. 640, 645, 139 A.2d 663 (1958); Dincher v. Great
A. & P. Tea Co., 356 Pa. 151, 156, 51 A.2d 710 (1947); Stiegelmann v.
Ackman, 351 Pa. 592, 598, 41 A.2d 679 (1945); Scheer v. Melville, 279 Pa.
401, 405, 123 A. 853 (1924); Crawford v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 208 Pa.
Super. 150, 221 A.2d 877 (1966); Commonwealth v. Blose, 160 Pa. Super.
165, 172, 50 A.2d 742 (1947); Selden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa.
Super. 500, 508, 43 A.2d 571 (1945). See the attempt to overrule this princi-
ple in Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 541, 260 A.2d 773 (1970).
Cf. 3 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 1018; HENRY, EVIDENCE § 801; Gougher v. Hans-
ler, 388 Pa. 160, 166, 130 A.2d 150 (1957).
112. Wolansky v. Lawson, 389 Pa. 477, 479, 133 A.2d 843 (1957); Cf.
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but this exception is open to serious question.113 It is the duty of
the trial court to instruct the jury as to the limited effect of the
prior statement' 14 but, in the absence of a request so to do, the
court's omission may not be considered reversible. 1 5 The content
of the prior statement will not support a finding based solely
thereon, and the jury must be permitted to resolve all alleged
contradictions." 6  Written prior statements admitted in evidence,
may, in the discretion of the trial judge, be sent out with the
jury." 7 However, the reduction to writing of an oral statement
which was used to impeach the credibility of a witness does not
make the writing admissible.""
D. Prior Statements as Memory Aids
1. To refresh recollection
There is no limitation upon the right of a witness to refresh his
recollection from a previously prepared document before he takes
the witness stand, since he is testifying from present recollection
when he is on the stand.
The means by which a witness can refresh his recollection
prior to trial are almost unlimited. He may refresh his
recollection from his own notes, which may have been
made at the time of the event or at a later date. He may
refresh his recollection by examining them at the trial, or
immediately before trial or many months prior thereto.
Mere retelling of an event may refresh the recollection of
the teller. A visit to the scene of an occurrence may re-
fresh one's recollection. Asking another person for a name
Commonwealth v. Bartell, 184 Pa. Super. 528, 136 A.2d 166 (1957);
Commonwealth v. Kibler, 215 Pa. Super. 367, 370, 258 A.2d 681 (1969).
113. See dissenting opinion in Wolansky v. Lawson, 389 Pa. 477, 133
A.2d 843 (1957).
114. Goodis v. Gimbel Bros., 420 Pa. 439, 442, 218 A.2d 574 (1966); Com-
monwealth v. Vento, 410 Pa. 350, 354, 189 A.2d 161 (1963); Herr v. Erb,
163 Pa. Super. 430, 433, 62 A.2d 75 (1948); Commonwealth v. Blose, 160
Pa. Super. 165, 172, 50 A.2d 742 (1947).
115. Wilson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 421 Pa. 419, 432, 219 A.2d 666 (1966);
Keefer v. Byers, 398 Pa. 447, 451, 159 A.2d 477 (1960); Bizich v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 391 Pa. 640, 645, 139 A.2d 663 (1958) (dissenting opinion);
Risbon v. Cottom, 387 Pa. 155, 163, 127 A.2d 101 (1956).
116. Danko v. Pittsburgh Rys., 230 Pa. 295, 79 A. 511 (1911).
117. Wilson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 421 Pa. 419, 219 A.2d 666 (1966);
Mitchell v. Shirey, 407 Pa. 204, 208, 180 A.2d 65 (1962) (party's statement
should be sent out); Whitfield v. Reading Co., 380 Pa. 566, 571, 112 A.2d
113 (1955) (unsigned transcript of stenographic statement of party-ques-
tionable-see dissent); Brueckner v. Pittsburgh. 368 Pa. 554, 558, 84 A.2d
197 (1951) (statement of party); Durdella v. Trenton-Philadelphia Coach
Co., 349 Pa. 482, 484, 37 A.2d 481 (1944) (statement not sent out, discretion
of trial judge); Brenner v. Lesher, 332 Pa. 522, 528, 2 A.2d 731 (1939).
118. Dinger v. Friedman, 279 Pa. 8, 17, 123 A. 641 (1924).
which "slipped one's mind" can refresh the recollection. A
look at a telephone book or calling the Revenue Depart-
ment for a license number may refresh one's recollection of
a forgotten number. Reading another's account of an
event may refresh the recollection of forgotten details.
Between the time of an event and the time of testifying
concerning it, a witness's recollection may be, and generally
is, refreshed many times in many different ways.119
The use of a prior statement by the witness in this way does
not permit the opposing party to introduce the statement in evi-
dence, and even its production by the witness for examination by
the opponent rests within the sound discretion of the court.
120
When on the witness stand, the witness must testify, if at all
possible, as to his present recollection. He may, therefore, use a
prior statement to refresh his recollection 12 1 but he must testify to
what he presently recalls, his memory having been refreshed.
Where a witness has a present recollection of a past event,
although his memory is refreshed by a memorandum made
at the time of the event, he testifies from such recollection;
but where he has no present recollection of such past
event, even when aided by his memorandum, the latter it-
self may be offered in evidence, on proof by the witness of
his knowledge of its accuracy when made and that it was
made when the transaction was fresh in his mind.
12
When the prior statement is sought to be used by the witness
while on the witness stand, multiple problems arise: First, the na-
ture of the statement which may be used;123 second, when must it
have been made; 2 4 third, does it in fact refresh his recollection; 12 5
fourth, may the statement be offered in evidence; 2 6 and fifth, if it
119. Commonwealth v. Fromal, 202 Pa. Super. 45, 46-47, 195 A.2d 174
(1963). See also Nestor v. George, 354 Pa. 19, 46 A.2d 469 (1946).
120. Commonwealth v. Fromal, 202 Pa. Super. 45, 195 A.2d 174 (1963).
121. Panik v. Didra, 370 Pa. 488, 88 A.2d 730 (1952); Nestor v. George,
354 Pa. 19, 46 A.2d 469 (1946); Lardieri v. Lamont, 172 Pa. Super. 35, 37,
92 A.2d 229 (1952).
122. Commonwealth v. Kendig, 215 Pa. Super. 139, 257 A.2d 354 (1969);
Miller v. Exeter Borough, 366 Pa. 336, 342, 77 A.2d 395 (1951).
123. Personal memoranda: Commonwealth v. Laniewski, 427 Pa. 455,
235 A.2d 136 (1967); Smith v. Smith, 364 Pa. 1, 9, 70 A.2d 630 (1950);
Lardieri v. Lamont, 172 Pa. Super. 35, 92 A.2d 229 (1952). Diary: Brown
v. Brown, 124 Pa. Super. 237, 188 A. 389, 189 A. 711 (1937). Police reports:
Panik v. Didra, 370 Pa. 488, 88 A.2d 730 (1952); Commonwealth v. Ford,
199 Pa. Super. 102, 184 A.2d 401 (1962). Typescript of notes: Edwards v.
Gimbel, 202 Pa. 30, 38, 51 A. 357 (1902). Mechanics' lien prepared by at-
torney but sworn to by the witness: Gallizzi v. Scavo, 406 Pa. 629, 179
A.2d 638 (1962). Book or memo: Nestor v. George, 354 Pa. 19, 46 A.2d 469
(1946). Refused: (Record made by another) Gordon v. Blizard, 106 Pa.
Super. 112, 114, 163 A. 43 (1932); (Prior notes of testimony) Velott v.
Lewis, 102 Pa. 326, 333 (1883).
124. Gibson v. Campbell, 242 Pa. 551, 555, 89 A. 662 (1914); Lardieri v.
Lamont, 172 Pa. Super. 35, 92 A.2d 229 (1952); Savin v. Michaelsen, 72
Pa. Super. 226 (1919).
125. Miller v. Exeter Borough, 366 Pa. 336, 77 A.2d 395 (1951); Pol-
izzi v. Commercial Fire Ins. Co., 255 Pa. 297, 99 A. 907 (1919); Common-
wealth v. Kendig, 215 Pa. Super. 139, 257 A.2d 354 (1969).
126. Miller v. Exeter Borough, 366 Pa. 336, 77 A.2d 395 (1951); Corn-
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does not refresh his recollection, may the statement itself be used
as evidence of past recollection. 12 7
2. Past Recollection Recorded
There are occasions on which the witness has read and con-
sidered his prior statement either before he takes the stand or dur-
ing his testimony; his recollection is not refreshed and he has no
present recollection of the facts. The question arises whether such
prior statements may be admitted.
A previous writing, made under appropriate circumstances,
may be used by the witness to testify as to his past recollection of
the facts-if he can verify on the witness stand that the writing ac-
curately represented his knowledge of those facts at the time it
was made' 28 and that his knowledge was first-hand and not hear-
say at the time.129 It is more difficult to determine exactly what
statements should be admitted under these circumstances. Gen-
erally, the writing must have been made at or near the time of the
events which it describes;13 0 the witness need not be the person
who made the writing;' 8 ' the original, and not a copy of the writing
must be produced if it is procurable; 82 but not otherwise; 3 3 a
written copy of an oral statement made by the witness may be
used if the person who made the written copy is produced to au-
thenticate it 134 but the copy may not be used if the witness himself
does not testify.185
monwealth v. Kendig, 215 Pa. Super. 139, 257 A.2d 354 (1969); In re
Reiter Liquor License, 173 Pa. Super. 552, 98 A.2d 465 (1953). Cf. Selover
v. Rexford's Executor, 52 Pa. 308, 310 (1866). But the statement is admis-
sible if a statement of a party: Finnerty v. Darby, 391 Pa. 300, 321, 138
A.2d 117 (1958). Note that we are not here concerned with the admissi-
bility of certain types of records such as hospital or physicians' charts
which may be admissible under the "regular entries" exception to the
hearsay rule.
127. Miller v. Exeter Borough, 366 Pa. 336, 77 A.2d 395 (1951); Chris-
tian Moerlein Brewing Co. v. Rusch, 272 Pa. 181, 187, 116 A. 145 (1932).
128. See, 3 WiaMoRE, EVIDENCE, § 747; Piggott v. Holloway, 1 Binney 436
(1808).
129. Nestor v. George, 354 Pa. 19, 46 A.2d 469 (1946); cf. District of
Columbia's Appeal (In re Finks Estate), 343 Pa. 65, 73, 21 A. 883 (1941);
3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 747.
130. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 745.
131. The J.S. Warden, 219 F. 517 (3rd Cir. 1914); WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 748.
132. 3 WIGMOaRE, EVIDENCE § 749.
133. Edwards v. Gimbel, 202 Pa. 30, 51 A. 357 (1902).
134. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 751; Ingraham v. Bockins, 9 S.&R. 285
(1823); Jones v. Fong, 3 Watts 328 (1834); Heart v. Hummel, 3 Pa. 414
(1846).
135. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 752.
When a statement is used for this purpose, it must be shown
to the opponent on request, to inspect and use on cross-examina-
tion.13 6 When such a statement is verified and adopted by the wit-
ness, it may be exhibited to and even sent out with the jury, in
the court's discretion."73 Thus, under some circumstances, the use
of a writing as past recollection recorded may prove to have greater
jury impact than its use to refresh present recollection.
136. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 753.
137. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 754; Commonwealth v. Butts, 204 Pa. Super.
302, 204 A.2d 481 (1964); Christian Morlein Brewing Co. v. Rusch, 272
Pa. 181, 116 A. 145 (1932); Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Boraef, 1 Rawle
152 (1829); Smith v. Lane, 12 S.&R. 80 (1824).
